We show that the classical interpretations of Tarski's inductive definitions actually allow us to define the satisfaction and truth of the quantified formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two essentially different ways: (a) in terms of algorithmic verifiabilty; and (b) in terms of algorithmic computability. We show that the classical Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA essentially defines the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA in terms of algorithmic verifiability. It is accepted that this classical interpretation-in terms of algorithmic verifiabilty-cannot lay claim to be finitary; it does not lead to a finitary justification of the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction of PA from which we may conclude-in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner-that PA is consistent. We now show that the PA-axiomsincluding the Axiom Schema of Finite Induction-are, however, algorithmically computable finitarily as satisfied / true under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA; and that the PA rules of inference do preserve algorithmically computable satisfiability / truth finitarily under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) . We conclude that the algorithmically computable PA-formulas can provide a finitary interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA from which we may classically conclude that PA is consistent in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner. We define this interpretation, and show that if the associated logic is interpreted finitarily then (i) PA is categorical and (ii) Gödel's Theorem VI holds vacuously in PA since PA is consistent but not ω-consistent.
Introduction
In a recent paper 1 , 'Evidence-Based Interpretations of PA', presented at the Symposium on Computational Philosophy at the AISB/IACAP 2012 World Congress, Birmingham, we showed first that-in addition to the classically defined Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of the first order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers-Alfred Tarski's classical definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation admit two evidence-based interpretations of PA under the standard first order logic FOL:
• An Instantiational interpretation I P A(N, Instantiational) of PA over the domain N of the PA numerals; and
• An Algorithmic interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA over the domain N of the natural numbers.
We then showed that the Instantiational interpretation I P A(N, Instantiational) of PA is sound if, and only if, the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA is sound; where we defined an interpretation of PA as sound if, and only if:
• The axioms of PA are true under the interpretation; and
• The PA rules of inference preserve such truth.
We further showed that:
• The axioms of PA are true under the Algorithmic interpretation I P A(N, Algo− rithmic) of PA; and
We concluded that:
• The Algorithmic interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA is sound; and
• PA is consistent.
The philosophical question addressed by our investigation
Our investigation sought to address the question:
• Is there any objective evidence to justify the acceptance of arithmetical propositions as 'true' on the grounds that such 'truth' is self-evident?
We noted, for instance, that conventional wisdom follows Tarski's inductive definitions of the 'satisfiability' and 'truth' of the formulas of a formal language such as PA under an interpretation when it implicitly and, as we shall show 2 , non-finitarily 3 holds that:
• The Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA over the domain N of the natural numbers is sound if the standard interpretation of FOL is sound.
In other words, conventional wisdom holds it as self-evident that-even though an infinite process is implicit in their decidability:
• The denumerable atomic formulas of PA can be assumed as decidable under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA;
• The denumerable PA axioms can be assumed to interpret as true under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA;
• The PA rules of inference can be assumed to preserve truth under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA.
What this means is that conventional wisdom also holds it as self-evident under the standard interpretation of FOL that-even though an infinite process is implicit in the decidability:
• The formula [(∀x)F (x) ] is decidable under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA.
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• If the formula [(∃x)F (x) ] is true under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA, then there must exist some numeral [n] for which the formula [F (n)] is true under the interpretation. 5 We also noted that-unless we assume that PA is ω-consistent-we cannot conclude by FOL that:
• If the formula [(∃x)F (x) ] is provable in PA, then there must exist some numeral [n] for which the formula [F (n)] is provable in PA.
What differentiates our approach?
Our approach to the above investigation can be differentiated by noting first that, in comparison, conventional wisdom-essentially following Hilbert 6 -can be labelled 'theistic' in that it implicitly assumes both that:
• The standard first order logic FOL is consistent;
and that:
• The standard interpretation of FOL is sound. 4 We note that, as emphasised by Edward Nelson in [Ne00] , the assumption of the unqualified decidability of quantified formulas under Tarski's definitions has been a matter of controversy. Theorem 10 now shows that the assumption is indeed untenable. 5 In other words Aristotle's particularisation (Definition 1) is valid-without qualificationover N . 6 In a 1925 address ( [Hi25] ) Hilbert had shown that the axiomatisation Lε of classical Aristotlean predicate logic proposed by him as a formal first-order ε-predicate calculus (detailed in [Hi27] , pp.465-466; see also Section 11, Appendix A) in which he used a primitive choice-function ( [Hi25] , p.382) symbol, 'ε', for defining the quantifiers '∀' and '∃' would adequately express-and yield, under a suitable interpretation-Aristotle's logic of predicates if the ε-function was interpreted to yield Aristotlean particularisation ([Hi25] , pp.382-383; [Hi27] , p.466 (1) ).
The significance of the label 'theistic' 7 is that conventional wisdom tacitly believes that Aristotle's particularisation 8 remains valid-without qualificationeven over infinite domains; a belief that is not unequivocally self-evident, but must be appealed to as an article of faith.
We note second that, in sharp contrast, constructive approaches to mathematicssuch as Intuitionism-can be labelled 'atheistic' since they deny both that:
• FOL is consistent (since they deny the Law of The Excluded Middle 9 .);
• The standard interpretation of FOL is sound (since they deny Aristotle's particularisation).
The significance of the label 'atheistic' is that whereas constructive approaches to mathematics deny the faith-based belief in the unqualified validity of Aristotle's particularisation over infinite domains, their denial of the Law of the Excluded Middle is itself a belief-in the inconsistency of FOL-that is also not unequivocally self-evident, and must also be appealed to as an article of faith 10 .
In our investigation, however, we follow what may be labelled an 'agnostic' approach by noting that although, if Aristotle's particularisation holds in an interpretation then the Law of the Excluded Middle must also hold in the interpretation, the converse is not true.
We thus follow a middle path by explicitly assuming that:
• FOL is consistent;
and explicitly state when an argument appeals to the postulation that:
• The standard interpretation of FOL is sound.
The significance of the label 'agnostic' is that we neither hold FOL to be inconsistent, nor hold that Aristotle's particularisation can be applied-without qualification-over infinite domains. 7 Although intended to highlight an entirely different distinction, that the choice of such a label may not be totally inappropriate is suggested by Tarski's point of view-as commented upon in [Fr09] , p.3-to the effect ". . . that Hilbert's alleged hope that meta-mathematics would usher in a 'feeling of absolute security' was a 'kind of theology' that 'lay far beyond the reach of any normal human science'. . . ".
8 Definition 1. 9 "The formula ∀x(A(x) ∨ ¬A (x) ) is classically provable, and hence under classical interpretation true. But it is unrealizable. So if realizability is accepted as a necessary condition for intuitionistic truth, it is untrue intuitionistically, and therefore unprovable not only in the present intuitionistic formal system, but by any intuitionistic methods whatsoever". [Kl52] , p.513.
10 Although Brouwer's explicitly stated objection appeared to be to the Law of the Excluded Middle as expressed and interpreted at the time ( [Br23] , p.335-336; [Kl52] , p.47; [Hi27] , p.475), some of Kleene's remarks ( [Kl52] , p.49), some of Hilbert's remarks (for instance in [Hi27] , p.474) and, more particularly, Kolmogorov's remarks (in [Ko25] , fn. p.419; p.432) suggest that the intent of Brouwer's fundamental objection can also be viewed today as being limited only to the yet prevailing belief-as an article of faith-that the validity of Aristotle's particularisation can be extended without qualification to infinite domains (see Section 11, Appendix A).
Overview
In this paper we revisit the arguments of [An12] and consider some consequences.
However, we begin by highlighting a critical aspect of Hilbert's and Kurt Gödel's reasoning concerning the consistency and completeness of Arithmetic, and note that the first order Peano Arithmetic PA is ω-consistent if, and only if, Aristotle's particularisation (Definition 1) is presumed to always hold under any interpretation of the associated logic (Section 3).
We then define what it means for a formula of an arithmetical language such as PA to be: We then show that:
(a) The PA-formulas are decidable under the standard interpretation of PA if, and only if, they are algorithmically verifiable under the interpretation (Corollary 5);
Although the standard interpretation is believed to define a model of PA, the definition cannot claim to be finitary since it does not lead to a finitary justification of the Axiom Schema of (finite) Induction of PA from which we may conclude-in an intuitionistically unobjectionable manner-that PA is consistent 11 . We note further that Gerhard Gentzen's 'constructive' 12 consistency proof for formal number theory 13 is debatably finitary 14 , since it involves a Rule of Infinite Induction that admits appeal to the well-ordering property of transfinite ordinals; and we show in Section 15, Appendix E that we cannot introduce a transfinite ordinal into any model of PA without inviting inconsistency.
(b) The PA-axioms are algorithmically computable as satisfied / true under the standard interpretation of PA (Lemmas 9 and 10); (c) Generalisation and Modus Ponens preserve algorithmically computable truth under the standard interpretation of PA (Lemmas 11 and 12); (d) The provable PA-formulas are precisely the ones that are algorithmically computable as satisfied / true under the standard interpretation of PA (Theorem 4).
We conclude that the algorithmically computable PA-formulas can provide a sound-in the sense of Definition 10-finitary interpretation of PA (Theorem 5).
11 The possibility/impossibility of such justification was the subject of the famous Poincaré-Hilbert debate. See [Hi27] We then show that if classical first-order logic is interpreted finitarily (Section 13, Appendix C) without the presumption that Aristotle's particularisation necessarily holds under the interpretation, then we may conclude that:
(f) PA is consistent (Theorem 6);
(g) PA is categorical (Corollary 7);
(h) PA is not ω-consistent (Corollary 9); (i) the standard interpretation of PA is not sound 15 , and does not yield a model for PA (Corollary 10).
Notation, Definitions and Comments
Comments We have taken some liberty in emphasising standard definitions selectively, and interspersing our arguments liberally with comments and references, generally of a foundational nature. These are intended to reflect our underlying thesis that essentially arithmetical problems appear more natural when expressed-and viewed-within the perspective of an interpretation of PA that appeals to the evidence provided by a deterministic algorithm along the lines suggested in Section 6; a perspective that, by its very nature, cannot appeal implicitly to transfinite concepts. Notation We use square brackets to indicate that the contents represent a symbol or a formula-of a formal theory-generally assumed to be well-formed unless otherwise indicated by the context. 17 We use an asterisk to indicate that the associated expression is to be interpreted semantically with respect to some well-defined interpretation.
Definition 1 Aristotle's particularisation This holds that from a metaassertion such as:
'It is not the case that: For any given x, P * (x) does not hold', usually denoted symbolically by '¬(∀x)¬P * (x)', we may always validly infer in the classical, Aristotlean, logic of predicates 18 that:
'There exists an unspecified x such that P * (x) holds', usually denoted symbolically by '(∃x)P * (x)'.
15 In the sense of Definition 10. 16 [Mu91] . 17 In other words, expressions inside the square brackets are to be only viewed syntactically as juxtaposition of symbols that are to be formed and manipulated upon strictly in accordance with specific rules for such formation and manipulation-in the manner of a mechanical or electronic device-without any regards to what the symbolism might represent semantically under an interpretation that gives them meaning.
18 [HA28] , pp.58-59.
The significance of Aristotle's particularisation for the first-order predicate calculus: We note that in a formal language the formula '[(∃x)P (x)]' is an abbreviation for the formula '[¬(∀x)¬P (x)]'. The commonly accepted interpretation of this formula-and a fundamental tenet of classical logic unrestrictedly adopted as intuitively obvious by standard literature 19 that seeks to build upon the formal first-order predicate calculus-tacitly appeals to Aristotlean particularisation.
However, L. E. J. Brouwer had noted in his seminal 1908 paper on the unreliability of logical principles 20 that the commonly accepted interpretation of this formula is ambiguous if interpretation is intended over an infinite domain.
Brouwer essentially argued that, even supposing the formula '[P (x)]' of a formal Arithmetical language interprets as an arithmetical relation denoted by 'P * (x)', and the formula '[¬(∀x)¬P (x)]' as the arithmetical proposition denoted by '¬(∀x)¬P * (x)', the formula '[(∃x)P (x)]' need not interpret as the arithmetical proposition denoted by the usual abbreviation '(∃x)P * (x)'; and that such postulation is invalid as a general logical principle in the absence of a means for constructing some putative object a for which the proposition P * (a) holds in the domain of the interpretation.
Hence we shall follow the convention that the assumption that '(∃x)P * (x)' is the intended interpretation of the formula '[(∃x)P (x)]'-which is essentially the assumption that Aristotle's particularisation holds over the domain of the interpretation-must always be explicit.
The significance of Aristotle's particularisation for PA: In order to avoid intuitionistic objections to his reasoning, Gödel introduced the syntactic property of ω-consistency 21 as an explicit assumption in his formal reasoning in his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions 22 .
Gödel explained at some length 23 that his reasons for introducing ω-consistency explicitly was to avoid appealing to the semantic concept of classical arithmetical truth in Aristotle's logic of predicates (which presumes Aristotle's particularisation).
We show in Section 3 that the two concepts are meta-mathematically equivalent in the sense that, if PA is consistent, then PA is ω-consistent if, and only if, Aristotle's particularisation holds under the standard interpretation of PA.
PA 9 For any well-formed formula [F (x)] of PA: Definition 10 Soundness (interpretation -non-standard): An interpretation I S of a formal system S is sound with respect to a domain D if, and only if, S is sound under the interpretation I S over the domain D.
Soundness in classical logic: In classical logic, a formal system S is sometimes defined as 'sound' if, and only if, it has an interpretation; and an interpretation is defined as the assignment of meanings to the symbols, and truth-values to the sentences, of the formal system. Moreover, any such interpretation is defined as a model 26 of the formal system. This definition suffers, however, from an implicit circularity: the formal logic L underlying any interpretation of S is implicitly assumed to be 'sound'. The above definitions seek to avoid this implicit circularity by delinking the defined 'soundness' of a formal system under an interpretation from the implicit 'soundness' of the formal logic underlying the interpretation. This admits the case where, even if L1 and L2 are implicitly assumed to be sound, S + L1 is sound, but S + L2 is not. Moreover, an interpretation of S is now a model for S if, and only if, it is sound. 
Hilbert's ω-Rule
To place the issue in the perspective of this paper, we assume that PA has a sound 37 interpretation over N , and consider whether it is true that 38 :
Algorithmic ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F * (x) that is algorithmically computable as true for any given natural number n, then the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA.
The significance of this query is that, as part of his program for giving mathematical reasoning a finitary foundation, Hilbert 39 proposed an ω-Rule as a finitary means of extending a Peano Arithmetic to a possible completion (i.e. to logically showing that, given any arithmetical proposition, either the proposition, or its negation, is formally provable from the axioms and rules of inference of the extended Arithmetic).
Hilbert's ω-Rule: If it is proved that the PA formula [F (x)] interprets as an arithmetical relation F * (x) that is true for any given natural number n, then the PA formula [(∀x)F (x)] can be admitted as an initial formula (axiom) in PA. Now, in his 1931 paper-which can, not unreasonably, be seen as the outcome of a presumed attempt to validate Hilbert's ω-rule-Gödel introduced the concept of ω-consistency 40 , from which it follows that: Moreover, it follows from Gödel's 1931 paper that one consequence of assuming Hilbert's ω-Rule is that there must, then, be an undecidable arithmetical proposition 42 ; a further consequence of which is that PA is essentially incomplete.
However, since Gödel's argument in this paper-from which he concludes the existence of an undecidable arithmetical proposition-is based on the weaker (i.e., weaker than assuming Hilbert's ω-rule) premise that a consistent PA can be ω-consistent, the question arises whether an even weaker Algorithmic ω-Rule (which, prima facie, does not imply that a consistent PA is necessarily ω-consistent) can yield a finitary completion for PA as sought by Hilbert, albeit for an ω-inconsistent PA.
Aristotle's particularisation and ω-consistency
We shall now argue that these issues are related, and that placing them in an appropriate perspective requires questioning not only the persisting belief that Proof The lemma follows from the definition of ω-consistency and from Tarski's standard definitions 45 of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of a formal system such as PA under an interpretation as detailed in Section 6. 2
Further:
41 However, we cannot similarly conclude from the the Algorithmic ω-Rule that a consistent PA is necessarily ω-consistent. 42 Gödel constructed an arithmetical proposition [R(x)] and showed that, if a Peano Arithmetic is ω-consistent, then both [(∀x)R(x)] and [¬(∀x)R(x)] are unprovable in the Arithmetic ([Go31], p.25(1), p.26(2)).
43 [Br08] . 44 In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10. 45 [Ta33] ; see also [Ho01] for an explanatory exposition. However, for standardisation and convenience of expression, We follow the formal exposition of Tarski's definitions given in [Me64] , p.50. Proof The lemma follows from the previous two lemma.
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In other words 48 :
Corollary 1 If PA is consistent and Aristotle's particularisation holds over N , then PA is ω-consistent. 2
It follows that:
Lemma 5 If Aristotle's particularisation holds over N , then PA is consistent if, and only if, it is ω-consistent.
The arguments of this section thus suggest that-contrary to conventional wisdom 49 -J. Barkley Rosser's claimed 'extension' of Gödel's argument 50 succeeds in avoiding an explicit assumption of ω-consistency only by implicitly appealing to the meta-mathematically equivalent Aristotle's particularisation 51 .
Although both Gödel's proof and Rosser's argument are complex, and not easy to unravel, the former has been extensively analysed and its various steps formally validated 52 in a number of expositions of Gödel's number-theoretic reasoning 53 . In sharp contrast, Rosser's widely cited 54 argument does not appear to have received the same critical scrutiny, and-lending force to Melvyn B. Nathanson's observation on the need for a more explicit exposition and examination of various implicit assumptions underlying the 'desperate' search for a common 'Mathematical Truth' 55 -its number-theoretic expositions generally remain either implicit or sketchy 56 .
It further follows that:
Corollary 2 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N . 2
As the classical, 'standard', interpretation of PA-say I P A(N, Standard) -appeals to Aristotle's particularisation 57 , it follows that:
Corollary 3 If PA is consistent but not ω-consistent, then the standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA is not sound 58 , and does not yield a model of PA. 2
Interpretation of an arithmetical language in terms of the computations of a simple functional language
We note next that we can, in principle, define 59 the classical 'satisfaction' and 'truth' of the formulas of a first order arithmetical language, such as PA, verifiably under an interpretation using as evidence 60 the computations of a simple functional language.
Such definitions follow straightforwardly for the atomic formulas of the language (i.e., those without the logical constants that correspond to 'negation', 'conjunction', 'implication' and 'quantification') from the standard definition of a simple functional language 61 .
Moreover, following Tarski's seminal 1933 paper on the the concept of truth in the languages of the deductive sciences 62 , the classical 'satisfaction' and 'truth' of those formulas of a first-order language which contain logical constants can be inductively defined, under an interpretation, in terms of the 'satisfaction' and 'truth' of the interpretations of only the atomic formulas of the language. Hence, classically, the 'satisfaction' and 'truth' of those formulas of an arithmetical language such as PA which contain logical constants can, in principle, also be defined verifiably under an interpretation using as evidence the computations of a simple functional language.
We show in Section 6 that this is indeed the case for PA under the standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) , when this is explicitly defined as in Section 7.
We show, moreover, that we can further define 'algorithmic truth' and 'algorithmic falsehood' finitarily under I P A(N, Standard) such that the PA axioms interpret as always algorithmically true, and the rules of inference preserve algorithmic truth, over the domain N of the natural numbers. For instance, if a formula [(∀x)F (x)] of an arithmetic is algorithmically true under an interpretation (such as I P A(N, Standard) ), then we may conclude that there is a deterministic algorithm that, for any given numeral [a], provides evidence that the formula [F (a)] is algorithmically true under the interpretation.
In other words, there is a deterministic algorithm that provides evidence that the interpretation F * (a) of [F (a)] holds in N for any given natural number a.
Defining the term 'hold': We define the term 'hold'-when used in connection with an interpretation of a formal language and, more specifically, with reference to the computations of a simple functional language associated with the atomic formulas of the language-explicitly in Section 6; the aim being to avoid appealing to the classically subjective (and existential) connotation implicitly associated with the term under an implicitly defined standard interpretation of an arithmetic 64 .
However, if a formula [(∀x)F (x)] of an arithmetic is algorithmically false under an interpretation, then we can only conclude that there is no deterministic algorithm that, for any given natural number a, can provide evidence whether the interpretation F * (a) holds or not in N .
We cannot therefore conclude that there is a numeral [a] such that the formula [F (a)] is algorithmically false under the interpretation; nor can we conclude that there is a natural number b such that F * (b) does not hold in N .
Such a conclusion would require:
63 This follows immediately from Corollary 8. 64 As, for instance, in [Go31] .
(i) either some additional evidence that will verify for some assignment of numerical values to the free variables of [F ] that the corresponding interpretation F * does not hold 65 ;
(ii) or the additional assumption that either Aristotle's particularisation 66 holds over the domain of the interpretation (as is implicitly presumed under the standard interpretation of PA) or that the arithmetic is ω-consistent 67 .
5 Defining algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability In the analogous case of number-theoretic relations, the following examples show that although every algorithmically computable number-theoretic relation with a single variable is algorithmically verifiable, the converse is not true.
Example 1:
Since any real number is definable as the limit of a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers:
• Let R(n) denote the n th digit in the decimal expression of the real number R in binary notation.
• Then, for any given natural number n, the first n digits in the decimal expansion of R define a rational number. Hence there is a deterministic algorithm AL R, n that will decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in the finite sequence {R(1) = 0, R(2) = 0, . . . , R(n) = 0}.
• Hence R(x) = 0 is algorithmically verifiable.
Example 2: Since it follows from Alan Turing's Halting argument 72 that there are algorithmically uncomputable real numbers:
• Let R(n) denote the n th digit in the decimal expression of an algorithmically uncomputable real number R in binary notation.
• However, there is no deterministic algorithm AL R that will decide the truth/falsity of each proposition in the denumerable sequence {R(1) = 0, R(2) = 0, . . .}.
• Hence the relation R(x) = 0 is algorithmically verifiable but not algorithmically computable.
We note that we can generalise Definition 12 to: We show in Section 6 that the 'algorithmic verifiability' of the formulas of a formal language which contain logical constants can be inductively defined under an interpretation in terms of the 'algorithmic verifiability' of the interpretations of the atomic formulas of the language; further, that the PA-formulas are decidable under the standard interpretation of PA if, and only if, they are algorithmically verifiable under the interpretation (Corollary 5).
We can similarly generalise Definition 13 to:
Definition 15 Algorithmic computability We show in Section 6 that the 'algorithmic computability' of the formulas of a formal language which contain logical constants can also be inductively defined under an interpretation in terms of the 'algorithmic computability' of the interpretations of the atomic formulas of the language; further, that the PA-formulas are decidable under an algorithmic interpretation of PA if, and only if, they are algorithmically computable under the interpretation .
We now show that the above concepts are well-defined under the standard interpretation of PA.
We note that algorithmic computability implies the existence of an algorithm for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions, whereas algorithmic verifiability does not imply the existence of an algorithm for deciding the truth/falsity of each proposition in a well-defined denumerable sequence of propositions.
72 [Tu36] , p.132, §8.
The implicit Satisfaction condition in Tarski's inductive assignment of truth-values under an interpretation
We first consider the significance of the implicit Satisfaction condition in Tarski's inductive assignment of truth-values under an interpretation.
We note that-essentially following standard expositions 73 of Tarski's inductive definitions on the 'satisfiability' and 'truth' of the formulas of a formal language under an interpretation-we can define: (iii) A * (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) holds in D for any W D .
Witness: From a finitary perspective, the existence of a 'witness' as in (i) above is implicit in the usual expositions of Tarski's definitions.
Satisfaction Method: From a finitary perspective, the existence of a Satisfaction Method as in (ii) above is also implicit in the usual expositions of Tarski's definitions.
A finitary perspective:
We highlight the word 'define' in (ii) above to emphasise the finitary perspective underlying this paper; which is that the concepts of 'satisfaction' and 'truth' under an interpretation are to be explicitly viewed as objective assignments by a convention that is witness-independent. A Platonist perspective would substitute 'decide' for 'define', thus implicitly suggesting that these concepts can 'exist', in the sense of needing to be discovered by some witness-dependent means-eerily akin to a 'revelation'-if the domain D is N .
Classically, we can now inductively assign truth values of 'satisfaction', 'truth', and 'falsity' to the compound formulas of a first-order theory S under the in- 1 , a 2 
We thus have that: We now consider the application of Tarski's definitions to various interpretations of first-order Peano Arithmetic PA.
The standard interpretation of PA
The standard interpretation
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as the underlying logic 78 ;
(b) we define D as N ;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of PA and sequence (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) of N , we take SATCON(I P A(N ) ) as:
. . , a * n ) holds in N and, for any given sequence
(d) we define the witness W (N, Standard) informally as the 'mathematical intuition' of a human intelligence for whom, classically, SATCON(I P A(N ) ) has been implicitly accepted as objectively 'decidable' in N ;
We shall show that such acceptance is justified, but needs to be made explicit since:
Lemma 6 A * (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , xn) is both algorithmically verifiable and algorithmically computable in N by W (N, Standard) .
Proof (i) It follows from the argument in Theorem 2 (below) that A * (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , xn) is algorithmically verifiable in N by W (N, Standard) .
(ii) It follows from the argument in Theorem 3 (below) that A * (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , xn) is algorithmically computable in N by W (N, Standard) . The lemma follows. 2
Now, although it is not immediately obvious from the standard interpretation of PA which of (i) or (ii) may be taken for explicitly deciding SATCON(I P A(N ) ) by the witness W (N, Standard) , we shall show in Section 6.3 that (i) is consistent with (e) below; and in Section 6.5 that (ii) is inconsistent with (e). Thus the standard interpretation of PA implicitly presumes (i).
(e) we postulate that Aristotle's particularisation holds over N 79 .
Clearly, (e) does not form any part of Tarski's inductive definitions of the satisfaction, and truth, of the formulas of PA under the above interpretation. Moreover, its inclusion makes I P A(N, Standard) extraneously non-finitary 80 .
78 Where the string [(∃ . . .)] is defined as-and is to be treated as an abbreviation forthe string [¬(∀ . . .)¬]. We do not consider the case where the underlying logic is Hilbert's formalisation of Aristotle's logic of predicates in terms of his -operator ([Hi27], pp.465-466).
79 Hence a PA formula such as [(∃x)F (x)] interprets under I P A(N, Standard) as 'There is some natural number n such that F (n) holds in N .
80 [Br08] .
The question arises: Can we formulate the 'standard' interpretation of PA without assuming (e) extraneously?
We answer this question affirmatively in Section 6.3 where:
(1) We replace the 'mathematical intuition' of a human intelligence by defining an 'objective' witness W (N, Instantiational) as the meta-theory M P A of PA;
(2) We show that W (N, Instantiational) can decide whether c * = d * is true or false by instantiationally computing the Boolean function A * (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , xn) for any given sequence of natural numbers (b * 1 , b * 2 , . . . , b * n ); (3) We show that this yields an instantiational interpretation of PA over the structure [N] of the PA numerals that is sound if, and only if, (e) holds.
(4) W (N, Instantiational) is thus an instantiational formulation of the standard interpretation of PA over N (which is presumed to be sound).
We note further that if PA is ω-inconsistent, then Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N , and the interpretation I P A(N, Standard) is not sound. (d) we postulate that SATCON(I P A(Nω) ) is always decidable by a putative witness W Nω , and that W Nω can, further, determine some numbers in N ω which are not natural numbers; (e) we assume that PA is ω-consistent.
Gödel's non-standard interpretation of PA
Clearly, the interpretation I P A(Nω, N on−standard) of a putative ω-consistent PA cannot claim to be finitary. Moreover, if PA is ω-inconsistent, then the Gödelian non-standard interpretation I P A(Nω, N on−standard) of PA is also not sound 81 .
An instantiational interpretation of PA in PA
We next consider the instantiational interpretation 82 I P A(N, Instantiational) of PA where:
81 In which case we cannot validly conclude from Gödel's formal reasoning in ( [Go31] ) that PA must have a non-standard model. 82 The raison d'être, and significance, of such interpretation is outlined in this short note.
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as the underlying logic;
(b) we define D as the set N of PA numerals;
(c) for any atomic formula [A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] of PA and any sequence [(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )] of PA numerals, we take SATCON(I P A(PA) ) as:
[A(a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n )] is provable in PA and, for any given sequence of numerals [(b 1 , b 2 It follows that if I P A(N, Instantiational) is sound then PA is ω-consistent and, ipso facto, Aristotle's particularisation must hold over N.
Moreover, if PA is consistent, then every PA-provable formula interprets as true under some sound interpretation of PA. Hence M P A can effectively decide whether, for any given sequence of natural numbers (b *
. . , b * n ) holds or not in N. It follows that I P A(N, Instantiational) is an instantiational formulation of the 'standard' interpretation of PA in which we do not need to extraneously assume that Aristotle's particularisation holds over N.
The interpretation I P A(N, Instantiational) is of interest because, if it were a sound interpretation of PA, then PA would meta-mathematically establish its own consistency 84 !
A set-theoretic interpretation of PA
We consider next a set-theoretic interpretation I P A(ZF , Now, if the set-theoretic interpretation I P A(ZF , Cantor) of PA is sound, then every sound interpretation of ZF would, ipso facto, be a sound interpretation of PA. In Appendix E, Section 15.2 I show, however, that this is not the case, and so the set-theoretic interpretation I P A(ZF , Cantor) of PA is not sound.
A purely algorithmic interpretation of PA
We finally consider the purely algorithmic interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA where:
(a) we define S as PA with standard first-order predicate calculus as the underlying logic; (b) we define D as N ; (c) for any atomic formula [A(x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n )] and sequence (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) of natural numbers in N , we take SATCON(I P A(N ) ) as: It follows that I P A(N, Algorithmic) is an algorithmic formulation of the 'standard' interpretation of PA in which we do not extraneously assume that Aristotle's particularisation holds over N .
We shall show that if I P A(N, Algorithmic) is sound, then PA is not ω-consistent. Hence Aristotle's particularisation does not hold over N , and the interpretation is finitary and intuitionistically unobjectionable. Moreover-since the Law of the Excluded Middle is provable in an ω-inconsistent PA (and therefore holds in N )-it achieves this without the discomforting, stringent, Intuitionistic requirement that we reject the underlying logic of PA!
PA is consistent: A finitary proof
It follows from the analysis of the classical applicability of Tarski's inductive definitions of 'satisfiability' and 'truth' in Section 6 that we can formally define-as detailed in Section 12, Appendix B-the standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA where:
(c) we take SM(I P A(N, Standard) ) as any simple functional language.
We note that:
Theorem 2 The atomic formulas of PA are algorithmically verifiable under the standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) . 
An algorithmic interpretation of the PA axioms
The significance of defining 'algorithmic truth' under I P A(N, Standard) as above is that:
Lemma 9 The PA axioms PA 1 to PA 8 are algorithmically computable as algorithmically true over N under the interpretation I P A(N, Standard) . [x ] are defined recursively 86 , the PA axioms PA 1 to PA 8 interpret as recursive relations that do not involve any quantification. The lemma follows straightforwardly from Definitions 16 to 21 in Section 6 and Theorem 2.
Lemma 10 For any given PA formula [F (x)], the Induction axiom schema Since the above cases are exhaustive, the lemma follows. 2
The Poincaré-Hilbert debate: We note that Lemma 10 appears to settle the Poincaré-Hilbert debate 87 in the latter's favour. Poincaré believed that the Induction Axiom could not be justified finitarily, as any such argument would necessarily need to appeal to infinite induction. Hilbert believed that a finitary proof of the consistency of PA was possible.
Lemma 11 Generalisation preserves algorithmic truth under I P A(N, Standard) .
Proof The two meta-assertions: It is also straightforward to see that:
Lemma 12 Modus Ponens preserves algorithmic truth under I P A(N, Standard) . 2
We thus have that:
Theorem 4 The axioms of PA are always algorithmically true under the interpretation I P A(N, Standard) , and the rules of inference of PA preserve the properties of algorithmic satisfaction/truth under I 
The algorithmic interpretation
We conclude that there is a deterministic algorithmic interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA over N -formally defined in Section 13, Appendix C-such that:
Theorem 5 The interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA is sound 90 .
Proof It follows immediately from Theorem 4 and Section 13, Appendix C, that the axioms of PA are always true under the interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) , and the rules of inference of PA preserve the properties of satisfaction/truth under I P A(N, Algorithmic) . 2
We thus have a finitary proof that:
Hilbert's Second Problem: We note-but do not consider further as it is not germane to the intent of this investigation-that Lemma 6 offers a partial resolution to Hilbert's Second Problem, which asks for a finitary proof that the second order Arithmetical axioms are consistent 91 .
A Provability Theorem for PA
We now show that PA can have no non-standard model 92 , since it is 'algorithmically' complete in the sense that: Since I P A(N, Algorithmic) is sound, it defines a finitary model of PA over N -say M P A(β) -such that:
] is algorithmically computable as always true in N ;
90 In the sense of Definitions 9 and 10. 91 "When we are engaged in investigating the foundations of a science, we must set up a system of axioms which contains an exact and complete description of the relations subsisting between the elementary ideas of that science. . . . But above all I wish to designate the following as the most important among the numerous questions which can be asked with regard to the axioms: To prove that they are not contradictory, that is, that a definite number of logical steps based upon them can never lead to contradictory results. In geometry, the proof of the compatibility of the axioms can be effected by constructing a suitable field of numbers, such that analogous relations between the numbers of this field correspond to the geometrical axioms. . . . On the other hand a direct method is needed for the proof of the compatibility of the arithmetical axioms." . . . David Hilbert (as translated in [Nw02] ). We note that Lemma 6 also appears to support Curtis Franks thesis in [Fr09] that Hilbert's intent behind the enunciation of his Second Problem was essentially to establish the autonomy of arithmetical truth without appeal to any debatable philosophical considerations. 92 We consider the usual arguments for the existence of non-standard models of PA in Section 16, Appendix F. 
The lemma follows. 2
We conclude that:
The provable formulas of PA are precisely those that are algorithmically computable as always true under a sound interpretation of PA.
We further conclude that 93 :
Corollary 7 PA is categorical.
PA is not ω-consistent
In his seminal 1931 paper on formally undecidable arithmetical propositions 94 , Gödel showed that 95 :
Lemma 13 If a Peano Arithmetic such as PA is ω-consistent, then there is a constructively definable PA-formula
93 cf. Hilbert's remarks at the International Congress of Mathematicians at Paris in 1900: "The axioms of arithmetic are essentially nothing else than the known rules of calculation, with the addition of the axiom of continuity. I recently collected them and in so doing replaced the axiom of continuity by two simpler axioms, namely, the well-known axiom of Archimedes, and a new axiom essentially as follows: that numbers form a system of things which is capable of no further extension, as long as all the other axioms hold (axiom of completeness)." . . . [Nw02] .
94 [Go31] . 
Gödel concluded that:
Lemma 14 Any ω-consistent Peano Arithmetic such as PA has a consistent, but ω-inconsistent, extension PA , obtained by adding the formula [¬(∀x)R(x)] as an axiom to PA 98 .2
Specifically, Gödel's reasoning shows that:
However, by the argument in Theorem 7 it now follows that:
Of course [¬(∀x)R(x)] interprets under I P A(N, Algorithmic) as the assertion:
There is no deterministic algorithm that will compute [R(x)] and, for any given natural number n, provide evidence that R * (n) is a true arithmetical proposition in N .
However, since Gödel has shown that the PA-formula [R(n)] is PA-provable for any given PA-numeral [n], it follows that:
For any given natural number n, there is always some deterministic algorithm that will compute [R(n)] and provide evidence that R * (n) is a true arithmetical proposition in N .
Thus the PA-formula [(∀x)R(x)] is algorithmically verifiable as true over N , but not algorithmically computable as true over N . The arithmetical relation R * (x) is thus a Halting-type of relation, such that although R * (x) is a tautology over N , there is no deterministic algorithm that will compute [R(x)] and, for any given natural number n, give evidence that R * (n) is a true arithmetical proposition in N .
We conclude that:
Corollary 9 PA is not ω-consistent. 
Conclusion
We have argued in [An12] that, although conventional wisdom is justified in assuming that the quantified arithmetical propositions of the first order Peano Arithmetic PA are constructively decidable under the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA over the domain N of the natural numbers, the assumption does not address-and implicitly conceals-a significant ambiguity that needs to be made explicit.
Reason: Tarski's inductive definitions admit evidence-based interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA that allow us to define the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of PA constructively over N in two essentially different ways.
• First in terms of algorithmic verifiabilty. We showed that classically this allows us to define an Instantiational interpretation I P A(N, Instantiational) of PA over the domain N of the PA numerals that is sound (i.e. PA theorems interpret as true in N ) if, and only if, the Standard interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA over N -which is not known to be finitary-is sound.
• Second in terms of algorithmic computability. We showed that this allows us to define a finitary Algorithmic interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA over N which is sound, and so we may conclude that PA is consistent.
In this paper we have shown that an immediate consequence of the above argumentation is that: IV. The logical ε-axiom
A(a) → A(ε(A))
Here ε(A) stands for an object of which the proposition A(a) certainly holds if it holds of any object at all; let us call ε the logical ε-function.. . .
1. By means of ε, "all" and "there exists" can be defined, namely, as follows:
On the basis of this definition the ε-axiom IV(13) yields the logical relations that hold for the universal and the existential quantifier, such as: Thus, Hilbert's interpretation of universal quantification-defined in (i)-is that the sentence (∀x)F (x) holds (under a consistent interpretation I F OL of F OL ) if, and only if, F (a) holds whenever ¬F (a) holds for any given a (under I F OL ); hence ¬F (a) does not hold for any a (since I F OL is consistent), and so F (a) holds for any given a (under I F OL ).
Further, Hilbert's interpretation of existential quantification-defined in (ii)-is that (∃x)F (x) holds (under I F OL ) if, and only if, F (a) holds for some a (under I F OL ).
Brouwer's objection to such an unqualified interpretation of the existential quantifier was that, for the interpretation to be considered sound when the domain of the quantifiers under an interpretation is infinite, the decidability of the quantification under the interpretation must be constructively verifiable in some intuitively and mathematically acceptable sense of the term "constructive" 106 .
Two questions arise:
105 [Hi27] . 106 [Br08] . (1c) F * (n) holds in N for some natural number n if, and only if, it is not the case that, for any given natural number n, ¬F * (n) holds in N.
Since (1a), (1b) This answers question (a).
Can we interpret quantification 'constructively' ?
Clearly, the specific target of Brouwer's objection is (1c), which appeals to Platonically non-constructive, rather than intuitively constructive, plausibility.
We can thus re-phrase question (b) more specifically: Can we define an interpretation of PA over N that does not appeal to (1c)?
Now, in this paper, we have defined the interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) over the structure N, where:
] is defined as true under I P A(N, Algorithmic) if, and only if, there is an algorithm that computes F * (n) as always true (i.e., as true for any given natural number n) in N ; (2b) [(∃x)F (x) ] is an abbreviation of [¬(∀x)¬F (x)], and is defined as true under I P A(N, Algorithmic) if, and only if, it is not the case that there is an algorithm that computes F * (n) as always false (i.e., as false for any given natural number n) in N. However, we have shown that PA is ω-inconsistent. Now, R(n) holds in N for any given natural number n, since Gödel has defined R (x) 109 such that R(n) is instantiationally equivalent to a primitive recursive relation Q(n) which is algorithmically computable as true in N for any given natural number n.
It follows that we cannot admit the standard (Hilbertian) interpretion of [¬(∀x)R(x)] under I P A(N, Standard) as: R(n) is false for some natural number n.
In other words, the interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA over the structure N is not sound.
It is not the case that there is an algorithm that computes R(n) as true under I P A(N, Algorithmic) for any given natural number n.
Moreover, an ω-inconsistent PA is consistent with the finitary interpretation of quantification, as in (2a) and (2b), since the interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) of PA over the structure N is sound.
Why the interpretation
The reason why the interpretation I P A(N, Standard) of PA over the structure N is not sound lies in the fact that, whereas (1b) and (2b) preserve the logical properties of formal PA-negation under interpretation under I P A(N, Standard) and I P A(N, Algorithmic) respectively, the further non-constructive inference in (1c) from (1b)-to the effect that F (n) must hold in N for some natural number n-does not, and is the one objected to by Brouwer 110 .
Thus the interpretation I P A(N, Standard) is not a model of PA, and Brouwer was justified in his objection to Hilberts unqualified interpretation of quantification.
It is implicit in the objection that, if we assume only simple consistency for Hilbert's system, then we cannot unconditionally define:
[(∃x)F (x)] is true under I P A(N, Standard) if, and only if, F (n) holds for some natural number n under I P A(N, Standard) . 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) holds in N for any W N .
We inductively assign truth values of 'satisfaction', 'truth', and 'falsity' to the compound formulas of PA under the interpretation I P A(N, Algorithmic) in terms of only the satisfiability of the atomic formulas of PA over N as follows 113 : 14 Appendix D: The need for explicitly distinguishing between 'instantiational' and 'uniform' methods
It is significant that both Gödel (initially) and Alonzo Church (subseque-ntlypossibly under the influence of Gödel's disquietitude) enunciated Church's formulation of 'effective computability' as a Thesis because Gödel was instinctively uncomfortable with accepting it as a definition that minimally captures the essence of 'intuitive effective computability' 115 .
Gödel's reservations seem vindicated if we accept that a number-theoretic function can be effectively computable instantiationally (in the sense of being algorithmically verifiable as envisaged in Definition 12 above), but not by a uniform method (in the sense of being algorithmically computable as envisaged in Definition 13).
The significance of the fact (considered above in Section 6) that 'truth' too can be effectively decidable both instantiationally and by a uniform (algorithmic) method under the standard interpretation of PA is reflected in Gödel's famous 1951 Gibbs lecture 116 , where he remarks:
"I wish to point out that one may conjecture the truth of a universal proposition (for example, that I shall be able to verify a certain property for any integer given to me) and at the same time conjecture that no general proof for this fact exists. It is easy to imagine situations in which both these conjectures would be very well founded. For the first half of it, this would, for example, be the case if the proposition in question were some equation F (n) = G(n) of two number-theoretical functions which could be verified up to very great numbers n."
117
Such a possibility is also implicit in Turing's remarks 118 :
"The computable numbers do not include all (in the ordinary sense) definable numbers. Let P be a sequence whose n-th figure is 1 or 0 according as n is or is not satisfactory. It is an immediate consequence of the theorem of §8 that P is not computable. It is (so far as we know at present) possible that any assigned number of figures of P can be calculated, but not by a uniform process. When sufficiently many figures of P have been calculated, an essentially new method is necessary in order to obtain more figures."
The need for placing such a distinction on a formal basis has also been expressed explicitly on occasion 119 . Thus, Boolos, Burgess and Jeffrey 120 define a diagonal function, d, any value of which can be decided effectively, although there is no deterministic algorithm that can effectively compute d. Now, the straightforward way of expressing this phenomenon should be to say that there are well-defined number-theoretic functions that are effectively computable instantiationally but not algorithmically. The issue here seems to be that, when using language to express the abstract objects of our individual, and common, mental 'concept spaces', we use the word 'exists' loosely in three senses, without making explicit distinctions between them (see [An07c] ).
Turing machine computes the function d, we were able to compute at least its first few values, For since, as we have noted, f 1 = f 1 = f 1 = the empty function we have d(1) = d(2) = d(3) = 1. And it may seem that we can actually compute d(n) for any positive integer n-if we don't run out of time."
122
The reluctance to treat a function such as d(n)-or the function Ω(n) that computes the n th digit in the decimal expression of a Chaitin constant Ω 123 -as computable, on the grounds that the 'time' needed to compute it increases monotonically with n, is curious 124 ; the same applies to any total Turing-computable function f (n) In other words, except 0, every element in the domain of any unrelativised interpretation of PA is a 'successor'. Further, x can only be a 'successor' of a unique element in any such interpretation of PA.
PA and Ordinal Arithmetic have no common model
Now, since Cantor's first limit ordinal, ω, is not the 'successor' of any ordinal in the sense required by the PA axioms, and since there are no infinitely descending sequences of ordinals 126 in a model-if any-of set-theory, PA and Ordinal Arithmetic 127 cannot have a common model, and so we cannot consistently extend PA to OA simply by the addition of more axioms.
Why PA has no set-theoretical model
We can define the usual order relation '<' in PA so that every instance of the Induction Axiom schema, such as, say: A significant point which emerges from the above is that we cannot appeal unrestrictedly to reasoning over transfinite ordinals when studying the foundational framework of PA.
Reason: The language of PA has no constant that interprets in any model of PA as the set N of all natural numbers.
Moreover, the preceding sections show that the Induction Axiom Schema of PA does not allow us to bypass this constraint by introducing an "actual" (or "completed") infinity disguised as an arbitrary constant -usually denoted by c or ∞ -into either the language, or a putative model, of PA.
16 Appendix F: Why the usual arguments for a non-standard model of PA are unconvincing
Although we can define a model of Arithmetic with an infinite descending sequence of elements 128 , any such model is isomorphic to the "true arithmetic 129 " of the integers (negative plus positive), and not to any model of PA 130 .
Moreover-as we show in the next section-we cannot assume that we can consistently add a constant c to PA, along with the denumerable axioms [¬(c = 0)], [¬(c = 1)], [¬(c = 2)], . . . , since this would presume that which is sought to be proven, viz., that PA has a non-standard model.
We cannot therefore-as suggested in standard texts 131 -apply the Compactness Theorem and the (upward ) Löwen-heim-Skolem Theorem to conclude that PA has a non-standard model.
Compactness Theorem: If every finite subset of a set of sentences has a model, then the whole set has a model 132 .
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem: Any set of sentences that has an infinite model has a non-denumerable model 133 .
A formal argument for a non-standard model of PA
The following argument 134 attempts to validate the above line of reasoning suggested by standard texts for the existence of non-standard models of PA: 16.2 The (upward ) Skolem-Löwenheim theorem applies only to first-order theories that admit an axiom of infinity
